The emergence of pervasive computing devices has raised several privacy issues. In this paper, we address the risk of tracking attacks in RFID networks. Our contribution is threefold: (1) We repair three revised EC-RAC protocols of Lee, Batina and Verbauwhede and show that two of the improved authentication protocols are wide-strong privacypreserving and one wide-weak privacy-preserving; (2) We present the search protocol, a novel scheme which allows for privately querying a particular tag, and proof its security properties; and (3) We design a hardware architecture to demonstrate the implementation feasibility of our proposed solutions for a passive RFID tag. Due to the specific design of our authentication protocols, they can be realized with an area significantly smaller than other RFID schemes proposed in the literature, while still achieving the required security and privacy properties.
INTRODUCTION
RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems are rapidly expanding their applications to many areas: supply chains, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. access control, health care, road pricing, etc. However, due to the wide spread of tags and its cheap implementations, these applications have the potential to cause security and privacy risks at a tag carrier. Especially, the privacy of RFID tags has been a hot issue recently [24, 25, 27] . Unfortunately, privacy features have initially been close to non-existent in the design of conventional authentication systems and therefore there is a lot of work to be done in the context of RFID applications.
Privacy should be clearly distinguished from security: while security addresses the soundness of a protocol, privacy addresses the resistance against unauthorized identification, tracking or linking tags. Privacy can be considered in two concepts: anonymity in which the real ID of a tag must be unknown, and untraceability in which the (in)equality of two tags must be impossible to determine. Therefore, untraceability is a stronger privacy requirement than anonymity. In the rest of this article, we will denote a scheme as privacypreserving when it achieves untraceability. Let us illustrate the difference between security and privacy with a practical example. The Schnorr protocol [26] is a well-known authentication protocol whose security properties can be formally proven [3] . However, it is not privacy-preserving because a tag (prover) can be traced by an eavesdropper as shown in [19] .
Several theoretical models to address the privacy of RFID systems have been proposed in the literature [2, 17, 23, 29] . To define privacy in this paper, we import two characteristics of attackers from the theoretical framework of Vaudenay [29] : wide (or narrow ) attackers and strong (or weak ) attackers. If an attacker has access to the result of the verification (accept or reject) in a server, he is a wide attacker. Otherwise he is a narrow attacker. If an attacker is able to extract a tag's secret and reuse it, he is a strong attacker. Otherwise he is a weak attacker. A wide-strong attacker is hence the most powerful. If a protocol is untraceable against a wide-strong attacker, we call the protocol widestrong privacy-preserving.
In this paper, we present three authentication protocols, which are a revision of the protocols of Lee, Batina and Verbauwhede [20] . Each protocol has different security characteristics and computational workload. Two of our improved authentication protocols are wide-strong privacy-preserving, and the other one is wide-weak privacy-preserving. We also present the search protocol, a novel scheme in which a server (or a reader) can efficiently query for a specific tag, without compromising privacy. Moreover, we present a hardware architecture that can realize the proposed protocols. Its performance results show that such schemes are feasible, even for a passive tag, and outperforms other secure and privacypreserving protocols proposed in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related work is reviewed. We propose our authentication protocols and a search protocol in Section 3 and 4, respectively. We show the implementation results of the proposed protocols for a particularly designed hardware architecture in Section 5. We conclude our paper in Section 6.
STATE OF THE ART
Recently, several solutions using public-key algorithms have been proposed in order to protect RFID tags from tracking attacks. In [19] , it is shown that some conventional publickey based authentication protocols, such as the Schnorr protocol and the Okamoto protocol, do not resist tracking attacks. Accordingly, EC-RAC (Elliptic Curve Based Randomized Access Control) protocols have been proposed in the same paper to address the established vulnerability. However, in [6, 8] , it is shown that EC-RAC is also vulnerable to tracking attacks and replay attacks, and in addition, the randomized Schnorr protocol has been proposed as an alternative of EC-RAC in [6] . Furthermore, Lee, Batina and Verbauwhede presented the revised EC-RAC protocols in [20] .
However, as also discussed in [9] , one can demonstrate that both the randomized Schnorr protocol and the revised EC-RAC are narrow-strong privacy preserving, but not widestrong privacy preserving.
There were many attempts to obtain authentication protocols for RFID tags by means of symmetric-key primitives [4, 11, 12, 28] . Engberg et al. [10] proposed a zero-knowledge authentication protocol for RFID tags which employs symmetric operations such as an XOR and cryptographic hash functions. Of other notable solutions for authentication protocols, we mention here the HB + protocol [18] that was presented as an extremely cheap solution (especially in hardware) but still secure against active adversaries. The HB + protocol is based on the work of Hopper and Blum (HB) [16] . However, many attacks followed, such as [14] , and the most recent one is of Frumkin and Shamir [13] . Several fixes have been proposed, such as the HB ++ protocol from Bringer et al. [5] . HB ++ is claimed to be secure against man-in-themiddle attacks (as in [14] ) but it requires additional secret key material and universal hash functions to detect the attacks.
Note that in this paper, we only consider RFID authentication protocols on the logical level. Danev et al. [7] have shown that one can also identify RFID tags with a high accuracy from a small distance (e.g., less than 1 meter), based on their physical-layer fingerprints. This technique automatically enables tag-to-server authentication. However the downside of this solution is the requirement that the distance between RFID tag and reader should be small, in order to have a high accuracy. On the other hand, allowing a large distance between reader and tag, as is the case for RFID authentication protocols on the logical level, gives more freedom to the attacker and hence makes him more powerful (e.g., it becomes easier to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks).
The solutions we will propose in this paper rely exclusively on public-key cryptography. In particular we use ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) [22] , since it reduces the length of certificates (compared to conventional public-key cryptographic techniques) and it has been shown that it can be realized on extremely low-cost platforms such as RFID tags and sensor nodes [21, 15] .
Let us introduce some notation. We denote P as the base point, and y and Y (= yP ) are the server's private-key and public-key pair, where yP denotes the point derived by the point multiplication operation on the Elliptic Curve group. x1 and X1(= x1P ) are a tag's private-key and public-key pair. A tag's public-key is also called a verifier. One should note, although the name suggests that it can be publicly known, that the public-key of the tag should be kept secret in the server. Revealing this key causes tracking attacks.
Revised EC-RAC Protocol
In the revised EC-RAC protocols [20] , which solve the weaknesses of the original EC-RAC protocol proposed in [19] , the tag-to-server authentication (a tag proves its authenticity to a server) is composed of the ID-transfer scheme and the password-transfer scheme. The two schemes are based on the same design concept, and therefore, we introduce the ID-transfer scheme only. Figure 1 : ID-Transfer Scheme [20] .
ID-Transfer Scheme
The ID-transfer scheme of EC-RAC is shown in Fig. 1 . In this scheme, a tag generates a random number rt1 and a point T1, and transfers T1 to the server. Then, the server responds with a random challenge rs1, and a tag produces and transfers another point T2 to the server. After receiving T2, the server calculates a tag's ID-verifier x1P (= X1), which is used to check whether the corresponding tag is registered in the server.
Security Analysis
In [20] , the security proof of the ID-transfer scheme is done by reducing it to well-known hard cryptographic problems. In order to show the security against replay attacks, the ID-transfer scheme is reduced to the Schnorr protocol, and in order to show the resistance against tracking attacks, it is reduced to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. However, in the attacker's model, an attacker's ability is limited to observing the exchanged messages and forging messages to impersonate a server or a tag. In other words, an attacker does not know when the server accepts or rejects (forced) messages (i.e. the attacker is assumed to be narrow).
Figure 2: Man-in-the-Middle Attack on the ID-Transfer Scheme [9] .
In [9] , Deursen and Radomirović demonstrate that manin-the-middle attacks can be carried out on the EC-RAC protocols when an attacker is wide, as shown in Fig. 2 . An attacker can utilize a set of messages {T1(= rt1P ), rs1, T2(= (rt1 + rs1x1)Y ))} exchanged in a previous protocol instance to generate the new set of messagesT
. By checking whether the server accepts the forged messages, an attacker can find out whether the currently communicating tag is equal to the tag that generated the messages that were eavesdropped during the previous protocol instance. As a result, a tag can be traced by a wide attacker.
Randomized Schnorr Protocol

Protocol Description
Another solution suggested to prevent tracking attacks is the randomized Schnorr protocol [6] , which was proposed by Bringer et al. The protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
• Server's input: y
In this protocol, a tag generates two random numbers rt1 and rt2, and computes and transmits the two corresponding messages T1 and T2 to the server. After receiving a challenge rs1 from the server, a tag computes the authentication code v using its private-key x1 and the random numbers rt1, rt2 and rs1. The value v is then sent to the server. Then, the server derives the tag's ID-verifier (x1P ) and checks if it is registered in the server.
Security Analysis
The randomized Schnorr protocol has a similar problem as the ID-transfer scheme. A man-in-the-middle attack that allows to track the tag is shown in Fig. 4 .
WIDE-STRONG UNTRACEABLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present three authentication protocols, of which two are wide-strong privacy-preserving and one is wide-weak privacy-preserving. We use similar design concepts and system settings as the EC-RAC protocols (see [20] ). There are two sub-modules: the ID-transfer scheme and the password-transfer (shortly, Pwd-transfer) scheme. The ID-transfer scheme itself can be used as an authentication protocol, or it can be combined with the Pwdtransfer scheme to achieve better properties. As shown in Table 1 , the server and the tag store more information when the two schemes are combined (ID&Pwd-Transfer). 
New ID-Transfer Scheme
Protocol Description
The man-in-the-middle attack shown in Fig. 2 is performed by manipulating messages exchanged in previous protocol instances. A possible solution to prevent this attack is to use a cryptographic hash function, as noted in [9] . However, this requires additional hardware to implement the cryptographic hash function, which is undesirable due to the limited hardware resources of a tag. To avoid this we suggest to introduce the required non-linearity by reusing ECoperations. Our solution is shown in Fig. 5 , where x(rs1P ) is the x-coordinate of rs1P . This solution only introduces a slight increase in the cost: the server and the tag need to perform one extra EC point multiplication.
Figure 4: Man-in-the-Middle Attack on the Randomized Schnorr Protocol.
• Server's input: y 
Protocol Analysis
The proposed ID-transfer scheme is analyzed in two phases: first the security analysis and then the privacy analysis. The security analysis is performed by reducing the proposed protocol to the Schnorr protocol. Reducing a protocol means that we modify a protocol to give an attacker more adversarial power (or more information). Therefore, the original protocol will be at least as secure as the reduced protocol (shown in Fig. 6 ). Since the security of the Schnorr protocol is proven in [3] , the reduction concludes the proof. For the privacy analysis, we first show its narrow-strong privacy and then expand the proof to wide-strong privacy.
• Security Analysis: We modify the proposed protocol such that the server transmits the following values in Steps 2) and 3) in Fig. 5 .
Since the mapping from rs1 toṙs1 (the x-coordinate of rs1P ) is deterministic, even if the server transmits both the values rs1 andṙs1 to a tag, the protocol derived is equivalent to the former one. Now we reduce the protocol by dropping rs1, so the server only transmitsṙs1 (as is shown in Step 3 of Fig. 6 ). Since rs1 is only used to deriveṙs1,ṙs1 is sufficient information for the tag to produce a response. However, by dropping rs1, an attacker gets more freedom to manipulateṙs1, since he does not need to derive it from rs1. In other words, in this case a tag does no longer know if the received challenge is an actual output of the one-way function of the EC point multiplication.
Verifier(Server) Prover(Tag) Another reduction is performed in Step 4. A tag transmits v(= rt1 +ṙs1x1) instead of T2(= (rt1 +ṙs1x1)Y ). Since given v and Y , T2 can be easily computed, an attacker gets extra information by eavesdropping v (instead of T2) in this reduced protocol.
The reductions described above result in a reduced protocol (Fig. 6) where the exchanged messages are equivalent to the Schnorr protocol. Hence, one can conclude that our proposed protocol can be reduced to the Schnorr Protocol.
• Narrow-Strong Privacy: This proof can be done similarly to the proof in [20] . The three messages exchanged in the protocol are:
rt1P is a random point generated by a tag, and rs1 a random value that is possibly controlled by an attacker. These two messages themselves include no information about a tag. The last message can be considered as an addition of two EC points as follows:
Assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, the first point rt1yP is a random secret shared between the server and a tag upon the transmission of rt1P . Therefore, the EC point addition can be considered as a one-time pad with a one-time secret key rt1yP , which means that (rt1 +ṙs1x1)Y is nothing more than a random point for an attacker. Note that there is no effect from rs1 on the one-time pad, which is the only message possibly controlled by an attacker. Therefore, the proposed protocol is narrow privacy-preserving. Another thing we can note is that the secret of the onetime pad, rt1yP , does not include any information about a tag. Therefore, even if an attacker knows the secret key of a tag, x1, it doesn't help for interpreting the encrypted message. So, the protocol is strong privacy-preserving.
• Wide-Strong Privacy: For a wide attacker, there is one-bit extra information compared to a narrow attacker: the decision of the server whether to accept a tag or not. The possible way to track a tag with this one-bit information is to forge current messages using authentic messages from the past and to observe the server's decision. If the current messages are properly forged, as in Fig. 2 , the decision can be an indication of whether the two sets of messages are generated by the same tag. This attack is possible due to the linear property of the EC group operation, which allows an attacker to manipulate challenges of the server. Therefore, if we can prevent an attacker from manipulating challenges, this attack can be prevented.
In the proposed protocol, the server and a tag use x(rs1P ) instead of rs1 as a challenge. This introduces a non-linear operation, since the resulting point is used as a scalar value, and an arbitrary control of x(rs1P ) is infeasible since the EC point multiplication is assumed to be a one-way function. Therefore, this prevents an attacker from properly relating with another set of messages.
Pwd-Transfer Scheme
Since the Pwd-transfer scheme is performed after the IDtransfer scheme, the server can look up the tag's information (x1 and X2) in a local database using the ID-verifier X1. Therefore, in the Pwd-transfer scheme, it is assumed that the server knows x1 and X2.
Protocol Description
The design concept of the Pwd-transfer scheme is similar to the ID-transfer scheme as shown in Fig. 7 . After generating rt1 and T1, a tag transmits T1 to the server. Then, the server responds with a random challenge rs1, which is used to deriveṙs1. Finally, using the received T2 from a tag, the server derives X2(= x2P ) and verifies it by comparing it with the stored Pwd-verifier in the database.
• Server's input: y, x 1 , X 2 (= x 2 P ) 
Protocol Analysis
The only difference from the ID-transfer scheme is in T2, where (rt1x1 +ṙs1x2)Y is used instead of (rt1 +ṙs1x1)Y . (rt1x1 +ṙs1x2)Y can be represented as follows:
Since x1 is known to both the server and a tag at this moment, and x2 is a secret information stored only in a tag,
can be regarded as a secret-key of a tag, and x1Y can be considered as a public key of the server. Therefore, the Pwd-transfer scheme is equivalent to the ID-transfer scheme, and the Pwd-transfer scheme has the same security and privacy properties as the ID-transfer scheme: it is at least as secure as the Schnorr protocol and wide-strong privacy-preserving.
ID&Pwd-Transfer Scheme
The Pwd-transfer scheme can be combined with the IDtransfer scheme. If only the ID-transfer scheme is used for authentication, the security level could be reduced if the number of tags is large. Since the authentication is performed by checking the existence of a derived ID-verifier in the server's database, the probability of a randomly generated ID being accepted by the server increases when the number of tags grows.
Protocol Description
The proposed ID-transfer scheme (Fig. 5) and Pwd-transfer scheme (Fig. 7 ) can be combined in two different ways: 
Security Analysis
In Protocol 2, the same random number rt1 is used for both the ID-transfer scheme and the Pwd-transfer scheme. While this reduces the computation load in a tag, this also causes a vulnerability to tracking attacks by a strong attacker. In other words, if an attacker knows the secret information of a tag, then he can track the tag by observing the exchanged messages. This can be seen in the following computation:
Y is a fixed value for a specific tag, it can be used to track a tag. Therefore, Protocol 2 is wide-weak private but not wide-strong private. This weakness can also be recognized by observing how the one-time pads are used. The one-time pads used for the ID-transfer and the Pwdtransfer in protocol 2 are rt1yP (in T2) and rt1x1yP (in T3). As long as x1 is unknown, the two one-time pads are observed by an attacker as independent random pads, assuming the hardness of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. However, if x1 is known to an attacker (which will be the case when he is a strong attacker), the two one-time pads are equivalent, which violates its one-time use.
In order to overcome this weakness of Protocol 2, we need to use a separate random number for the Pwd-transfer scheme, as shown in Fig. 9 . As a result, the two onetime pads, rt1yP and rt2x1yP are independent, even if x1 is known by the attacker. Protocol 3 is hence wide-strong private. It offers the highest security and privacy protection (compared to the other two randomized authentication protocols presented in this section).
SEARCH PROTOCOL DESIGN
The search protocol for an RFID system aims to find a specific tag in a pool of many tags. If one of the secure authentication protocols presented in this paper is used to search for a specific tag, the server must authenticate each • Sever's input: y, tag one by one in a random order. In this case, the computation complexity will increase linearly with the number of the tags. Suppose we have a large library where each book is equipped with a tag. A book can be easily misplaced by any chance (e.g., because of a visitor's negligence or a librarian's mistake). If we just use a randomized authentication protocol to find a specific book, the server should authenticate half of the books in the library on average. Therefore, designing an efficient, secure search protocol is essential in an RFID system.
In an efficient search protocol, the server would expect to only receive a response from a designated tag. Otherwise, the server should handle responses from multiple tags. On the other hand, a tag should not respond before properly authenticating the server since a query may not be from an authentic server, but from an attacker who wants to track the tag. Therefore, the protocol should be a one-round protocol, and a tag should authenticate the server without giving any challenge. Note that we should also consider the possibility of replay attacks, since an attacker can reuse messages from the past to force a specific tag sending responses. Moreover to prevent tracking attacks, the messages from the server should be only understandable to the designated tag.
There is a requirement and a limitation on the privacy in the search protocol. Since only the designated tag responds to the server, an attacker can know if the messages from the server is accepted by a tag (because in that case, the tag will send a response). Therefore, the protocol must be wide privacy-preserving. In addition, if an attacker knows the secret keys of a tag (i.e. the attacker is strong), he can interpret the server's messages as much as the tag itself, since the tag does not share any one-time session key (or secret) with the server. The attacker hence knows exactly which tag the server is looking for. From the moment he observes that a tag sends a response, he knows the requested tag is present. As a result, we will propose a one-round search protocol that is wide-weak privacy-preserving. It remains an open problem if one can design a search protocol that achieves strong privacy without relaxing the efficiency requirements (such as having a one-round protocol).
Before discussing the design, let us first summarize the search protocol's requirements:
1. One-Round Authentication. The protocol should be completed in one round. Therefore, the server should generate messages without receiving a challenge from a tag.
2. Dedicated Authentication. Only the designated tag should be able to verify that the messages are generated by the server.
3. Security Against Replay Attacks.
4. Wide-Weak Privacy.
Protocol Description
In order to prevent replay attacks, the server should somehow utilize a challenge from a tag, which requires at least two rounds. So, we first design a two-round protocol and reduce it to a one-round protocol. A two-round protocol can be considered as a function f (c) in the server, which outputs authentication messages using as input the challenge c (sent by the tag) as follows:
where r is a random number. In order to reduce it to a one-round protocol, we change the protocol such that the server generates a challenge instead of receiving it from a tag. Therefore, the server will generate the following three messages and transmit.
{c, rP, r(x1 + c)x2P }
To prevent replay attacks, we need to make sure that c cannot be used twice. A tag can keep a counter and update it each time a valid message is received. This way, the received counter is always bigger than the stored one. The final search protocol is shown in Fig. 10 .
• Server Input: x 1 , X 2 (= x 2 P ), cs (server counter).
• Tag Input: x 1 , x 2 , ct (tag counter).
A. Server → Tag (Message Generation): cs, rP , r(x 1 + cs)X 2
Figure 10: The Search Protocol
After verifying the messages from the server, a tag can respond to the server. In order to make sure that the proper tag is responding to the server, a tag-to-server authentication protocol should follow the search protocol. This will be further discussed in Sect. 4.3. The search protocol itself (without combining it with an authentication protocol) requires the server and a tag to perform two EC point multiplications each.
Note that the search protocol has the same parameter settings as the ID&Pwd-transfer scheme (see Table 1 ).
Search Protocol Analysis
We prove that the proposed protocol satisfies all the four conditions for the search protocol.
One-Round Authentication
The search protocol is definitely a one-round authentication protocol. The server only sends a single (query) message to the tag. The authentication itself takes place during the tag-to-server authentication protocol.
Dedicated Authentication
Only the valid server can generate the messages since it requires x1 and X2, and only a specific tag can verify them since it requires x1 and x2.
Security against Replay Attacks
For this attack, an attacker should be able to generate r(x1 + c)x2P = rx1x2P + rcx2P for a new value of c using some of the previously exchanged protocol messages. Since x1 and x2 are fixed, independent random values, x2P and x1x2P can be considered as two independent publickeys of a tag. Therefore, by the transmission of rP , the server and a tag can share two independent shared-secrets of rx2P and rx1x2P , which are indistinguishable from a random point, assuming the hardness of the Decisional DiffieHellman problem. Therefore, r(x1+c)x2P can be considered as follows for an attacker.
where R1 and R2 are random points. Note that R1 and R2 are unknown to an attacker and independently generated each time of the protocol. This can be reduced to ECDSA [1] (see Fig. 11 ) where a signature on c is computed, as shown in Theorem 1. Therefore, as long as ECDSA is a secure signature algorithm, an attacker should not be able to generate another valid message for a different value of c. Proof. In ECDSA, a signature on m is computed as follows.
where (x1, y1) = kP , k is a random number, e = SHA1(m) and d is the private-key of the signature generator. We can consider a new signature algorithm which is stronger than ECDSA as follows.
where r1, r2 and r3 are independent random numbers. In order to verify the signature of Eq. (10), a verifier should receive r1, r2 and r3 securely. A way to transfer these values securely is out of the scope of this paper. At this moment, we just care about whether an attacker can get any advantage by eavesdropping the exchanged message (i.e. the signature on m). Nevertheless, what we can be sure of is that Eq. (10) is at least as secure as Eq. (9) . Now let us have a closer look to our proposed search protocol.
{c, rP, r(x1 + c)x2P } = {c, rP, rx1x2P + crx2P } c is comparable with the message e being signed, and rP , rx1x2P and rx2P are comparable with three random values r1, r2 and r3. rP is an actual random point, and rx1x2P and rx2P are undistinguishable from real random points for an attacker as long as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. Therefore, the search protocol can be reduced to ECDSA with the assumption of the hardness of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.
Wide-Weak Privacy
There are three exchanged messages in the protocol: c, rP , r(x1 + c)x2P . Among these messages, rP is a random point and r(x1 + c)x2P is indistinguishable from a random point as long as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. Therefore, an attacker has no benefit from these two messages to track a tag. Therefore, the protocol is at least narrow-weak private. An wide attacker knows whether a set of messages is accepted or not. In order to utilize this decision, an attacker should be able to forge a set of messages related with a valid message set and check if it is accepted by a tag, similar to the attacks shown in Fig. 2 and 4 . However, a successful attack would mean that an attacker can generate a valid digital signature (taking into account that the search protocol can be reduced to ECDSA). Therefore, the proposed search protocol is wide-weak private.
Note that c does not involve any secret information of a tag. However, if c is a counter being queried for a specific tag, it could cause some leakage. This can be solved by increasing c in a different way. The server may keep only one counter and use it for all the tags. Since a tag will accept the counter as long as it is larger than the saved value, the protocol will work and the revealed counter will not indicate how many times a certain tag has been queried.
An alternative solution is the use of a time stamp. Since the time is incremental like a counter, it prevents reusing the value c. Note that the tag does not need to generate the value c (it only has to check that the value is larger than the saved value), and hence does not need to have a timer. By using a time stamp, c will no longer be a counted number of queries. Even if the time stamp covers up to 1000 years with a precision down to nsec, this resolution can be covered with 65 bits, which is much less than a full word size (e.g., 163 bits) for a reasonable security level.
Combining the Authentication Protocols
After a successful instantiation of the search protocol, an RFID tag can detect that the server is searching it. Next, the tag will authenticate itself to the server. However, one should take care that the response from the tag does not allow an attacker to track it. That is why the search protocol should be combined with the Pwd-transfer scheme. Since the server is only expecting a response from one particular tag, the ID-transfer scheme is not necessary. When combining the search protocol and the Pwd-transfer scheme, we need to check that the necessary privacy and security properties still hold. The exchanged messages in the Pwd-transfer scheme are as follows:
The exchanged messages in the search protocol are as follows:
(rt1x1 +ṙs1x2)Y is the only message using the base point Y , and therefore, it will be independent of the messages in the search protocol. Moreover, the other messages in the Pwd-transfer scheme, rt1P and rs1, are random values that are not used in the search protocol. Therefore, they are independent. As a result, the combination of the search protocol and the Pwd-transfer scheme will inherit the weaker security and privacy properties of the two protocols. The combined protocol is hence wide-weak privacy-preserving (i.e. as the search protocol). It does not protect against a wide-strong attacker, since such an attacker can interpret the message sent by the server in the search protocol (and hence knows which particular tag the server is looking for). If the attacker detects that a tag replies to the server's message (without the attacker being able to interpret the response), he knows that the requested tag is present, and can hence track it.
The privacy of the authentication protocols and the search protocol is summarized in Table 2 . The table also shows the required number of EC point multiplications, which is the most exhaustive computation carried out in the protocols. 
IMPLEMENTATION
In order to show the feasibility of the proposed protocols for RFID tags, we analyze a hardware implementation of our solutions. The EC processor that we designed has an architecture similar to the one of Lee et al. presented in [21] . However, further optimizations are performed in our work, and the overall architecture is shown in Fig. 12 .
The processor is composed of a micro controller, a bus manager and an EC processor (ECP). It is connected with a front-end module, a random number generater (RNG), ROM and RAM as shown in the overall architecture of Fig. 12 . The solid arrows are for data exchange and the dash arrows are for addressing. The control signals are omitted in the picture. The ROM stores program code and data. The program is executed by the micro controller and the data may include a tag's private key, the server's public key and system parameters. The program is basically an authentication protocol. The micro controller is able to perform general modular arithmetic operations (additions and multiplications) in a byte-serial fashion. It also gives commands for the execution of the ECP via the bus manager. The ECP loads a key (k) and an EC point (P ) from ROM or RAM and The main differences when compared with [21] are in the register file and the MALU (Modular ALU). The original EC processor uses a MALU which performs modular addition and multiplications, and it reuses the logic of modular multiplications for modular square operations. On the other hand, the new MALU we designed includes a specialized squarer logic. Since the modular squaring can be completed in one cycle on a dedicated squarer while the modular multiplication is performed in a digit-serial fashion, the performance can be substantially increased with an overhead of the square logic. Moreover, the size of register file is reduced from 6 × 163 bits to 5 × 163 bits. This reduction is possible since the specialized squarer requires only one operand while the reuse of a multiplier for squaring requires two operands of the same value. As a result, the overall circuit area can be reduced further even after including the squarer in the MALU while achieving a much higher performance.
The performance comparison is summarized in Table 3 where both architectures have the digit size of 4 in the MALU. This work achieves about 24% better performance with a smaller circuit area, and the energy consumption is much smaller. Moreover, this work includes the coordinate conversion to affine-coordinates from Z-coordinates while the work of [21] gives outputs in Z-coordinates. The performance results of our proposed protocols are summarized in Table 4 where a 0.13µm CMOS technology is used, and the gate area does not include RNG, ROM and RAM which are required to store or run the programmed protocols. The area specifies a complete EC processor with the required registers. The protocols 1, 2 and 3 are the three different types of the tag-to-server authentication protocols (Fig. 5, 8 and 9 , respectively).
According to [12] , the current consumption for all security services on RFID should not exceed 15µA, which corresponds to 22.5µW for 1.5V in our CMOS library. Therefore, the power consumption of 13.8µW in our design will be low enough, even if we count the extra power consumption in the required memory.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper three new authentication protocols that are resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks are presented, as improvement of the work of Lee, Batina and Verbauwhede [20] . Each protocol has different security characteristics and computational workload. In order to analyze the privacy properties of our protocols, we used parts of the adversarial model defined in the theoretical framework of Vaudenay [29] . In this context, two of our improved authentication protocols are wide-strong privacy-preserving, and the other one is wide-weak privacy-preserving. Further on, the search protocol is presented as a novel scheme where a server (or a reader) can efficiently query for a specific tag, without compromising the tag's privacy.
In addition, we presented a hardware architecture, which can be produced with less than 15 Kgates, that can realize the proposed randomized authentication and search protocols. The performance results show the feasibility of the proposed protocols, even for a passive tag, and outperform other secure and privacy-preserving protocols published in the literature.
